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State Enforcement in a Polycentric World
David A. Hyman, William E. Kovacic*
If you tell the Army “Secure that building!” They will
surround it with armor and heavy infantry and not let
anyone out of it until told to[.] If you tell the Marines
“Secure that building!” They will storm the building,
eliminate any resistance, and allow no one to enter it until
told to. If you tell the Navy “Secure that building!” They
will turn out the lights, close and lock all doors and
windows and post a fire watch. If you tell the Air Force
“Secure that building!” They will take out a 30-year lease
with an option to buy.1
—Anonymous Reddit Post
It was the late 1950s and General Curtis LeMay was the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Air Force and the Navy
at that time were vying for who would have the primary
mission of the strategic defense of the country. The Air
Force was advocating its land based strategic bombers and
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy was
advocating its ballistic missile submarines and putting
nuclear capable aircraft aboard aircraft carriers. The
debate was heated and there was not enough money to do
both. The future missions of both services were at stake.
An Air Force Colonel was briefing General LeMay on the
Soviet threat versus the strategic requirements funded in
the budget. The Colonel told General LeMay that the
Russians, our enemy, were capable of . . . and at that point
General LeMay stopped him. LeMay was quoted

* Hyman is Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Kovacic is Global
Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University School of Law,
and a Non-Executive Director of the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority.
The views expressed here are the authors’ alone.
1. The Differences Between the Branches of the US Military, REDDIT (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.reddit.com/r/Jokes/comments/81n73v/the_differences_between_the_bran
ches_of_the_us/.
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as saying, “The Russians are our adversary. The Navy is
our enemy.”2
—John Melchner
“State Enforcement in an Interstate World” is an important topic—
fully deserving of all the attention it has received. Past commentators on
this topic have generally treated the federal government as a unitary
entity. Building on prior work on the subject, this Article explores the
polycentric nature of federal regulatory authority and shows how
cooperation and rivalry have long been dominant realities of the modern
administrative state. The Article discusses how these dynamics complicate
analysis of state enforcement in an interstate world and identifies
strategies for reducing the frequency and magnitude of the seemingly
inevitable conflicts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For legal academics, there is no shortage of policy perennials
and federalism is always near or at the top of that list. Debates over
2. John Melchner, Managing the Budget Process, 1998 J. PUB. INQUIRY 11, 13,
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/jpifw98.pdf.

1448

002.HYMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1447

9/25/20 11:24 AM

State Enforcement in a Polycentric World

the proper allocation of regulatory authority in a federalist system
and the role of state enforcement in an interstate world have waxed
and waned in intensity, but they have never been non-issues.3
Careers have been made and tenure has been granted for
participating in these debates.4
Those involved in these debates have generally treated both
federal and state authority as unitary entities, although recent
scholarship has recognized the possibility of plural interests within
an individual state—such as when the AG is from one political
party, and the governor is from another political party.5 Less
attention has been paid to the ways in which regulatory and
enforcement authority is also divided and shared within and across
agencies within the federal government and how that polycentric
reality might (or should) affect the federalism debate.
In theory, each of the entities with regulatory authority could
“mind their own business”—minimizing the possibility of friction,
conflict, and inconsistency. Alternatively, each of the entities with
regulatory authority could “play nice,” by coordinating their
activities to minimize the possibility of such problems. Although
federal agencies often manage to either “mind their own business”
or “play nice,” there are also reasonably frequent circumstances
when they do neither. Drawing from examples across the
administrative state, this Article shows how fragmentation of regulatory and enforcement authority within the federal administrative

3. The intensity of these debates has boomed after major shifts in the division of
authority and/or the perception that such shifts were necessary (i.e., the New Deal, World
War II, and the Civil Rights movement). There have also been less impressive boomlets after
more minor adjustments (i.e., New Federalism, Obamacare, and decisions by the Supreme
Court involving dual sovereignty).
4. We are not aware of a prize for coming up with the cutest name for the various
theories of federalism, but that has not deterred participants in these debates from doing
their utmost to come up with cute names, including “Marble Cake Federalism,” “Layer Cake
Federalism,” and “Picket Fence Federalism.” Less cute names include “Our Federalism,”
“Progressive Federalism,” “New Federalism,” “Dual Federalism,” “Cooperative
Federalism,” “Fiscal Federalism,” and “Creative Federalism.” Federalism debates appear to
attract frustrated taxonomists.
5. Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 1689, 1754–55 (2018); Bridget A. Fahey, Health Care Exchanges and the Disaggregation of
States in the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 56 (2015),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Fahey_PDF_zhtyvuqa.pdf.
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state has resulted in both cooperation and conflict.6 These dynamics
of polycentric federal regulatory authority further complicates the
problem of state enforcement in an interstate world, rendering it
into an even more “wicked” problem than would otherwise be the
case.7
II. FEDERAL POWER: THE POLY-CENTRIC REALITY
We begin with three brief case studies, drawn from competition
law, privacy, and the humble (but tasty) salmon.
A. Competition Law
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) have long shared regulatory authority over certain
aspects of competition law. During the 1920s, there were cases
where both agencies opened files to deal with the same conduct.
For obvious reasons, this dynamic created repeated conflicts—so
the agencies devised informal methods of consultation to avoid
duplicative parallel inquiries. This “good fences make good
neighbors” approach resulted in a written liaison arrangement
(commonly called “clearance”) which allowed the agencies to avoid
conflicts in the exercise of their concurrent regulatory power.8 A
2002 press release describes the clearance process, as well as some
of the challenges that deregulation and technological chance posed
to the smooth functioning of that process:
The FTC/DOJ clearance process was formally established in 1948;
refinements were implemented in 1963, 1993, and 1995. The

6. Even when agencies have chosen to avoid conflicts by focusing on their own policy
duties—i.e., they have chosen to “stay in their own lanes”—there are instances in which new
policy issues arise and do not fit clearly within the mandate of any existing agency. The
modern policy domain of privacy emerged from the 1960s onward as a distinct, largely novel
area of concern. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who
Should Do What, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1117 (2019). The appearance
of regulatory terra nova can trigger contests among agencies seeking to stake claims to the
new terrain.
7. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973).
8. James C. Grimaldi, Enron Case Attracts Lawyers Like a Flame Attracts Moths, More
than You Can Shake a Stick at, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at E2 (“There are a handful of
industries in which both the FTC and Justice Department have expertise. So when a hot
merger comes up, and the staff of each agency wants a piece of it, the assistant attorney
general for antitrust and the FTC chairman have to sort it out.”).
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traditional methodology for allocating matters between the
agencies has emphasized historical experience in addressing
specific commercial sectors. As the boundaries that separate
individual sectors have blurred in the face of rapid technological
change, and as deregulation measures have allowed firms to
diversify, this clearance methodology has begun to break down.
In a growing number of important economic sectors of mutual
concern to the FTC and the DOJ, the effectiveness of the
experience-based allocation methodology that has anchored past
clearance agreements has diminished significantly.9

The FTC and DOJ sought to resolve this dispute by negotiating
and publishing a comprehensive statement that described the
division of labor the two agencies intended to follow with respect
to specific market sectors, and set out how future disagreements
would be resolved.10 Although the DOJ ultimately abrogated the
agreement under pressure from Senator Ernest Hollings, the
underlying dynamics that gave rise to these problems have not
changed materially in the intervening years.11 As such, it should not
come as a surprise that in 2019 the FTC and DOJ negotiated a
similar agreement focusing on the tech sector. Pursuant to that
agreement, the FTC agreed to focus on Facebook and Amazon, and
the DOJ agreed to focus on Google and Apple.12 (The irony of two
competing competition agencies repeatedly negotiating over how
best to divide a market does not escape us).
Roughly two months later, a turf war broke out when the DOJ
asserted it would be reviewing the behavior of “social media[] and
some retail services online”—a statement that was “widely
interpreted by the legal community to mean Facebook and
Amazon, two companies that under the earlier agreement stood to

9. Press Release, FTC, FTC and DOJ Announce New Clearance Procedures for
Antitrust Matters: Memorandum of Agreement Allocates Industry Sectors Between
Agencies (Mar. 5, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/03/ftcand-doj-announce-new-clearance-procedures-antitrust-matters.
10. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental
Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1483 (2014).
11. Id.; see also Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 FTC/DOJ
Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (2007).
12. Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Congress, Enforcement Agencies Target Tech,
WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2019, 7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-to-examine-howfacebook-s-practices-affect-digital-competition-11559576731.
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have at least some of their conduct reviewed by the FTC.”13 Such
claim-jumping heightened tensions between the two agencies,
which were already inflamed by the DOJ’s recent intervention in a
case the FTC brought against Qualcomm.14 Such disagreements are
not new: any list would include the dispute in 2008 over the
appropriate standards for enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act,15
the FTC’s opposition in 2007 to the granting of cert in a private
antitrust case against Pacific Bell where the DOJ filed an amicus
brief urging the granting of cert, the DOJ’s 2005 opposition to the
13. John D. McKinnon & James V. Grimal, Justice Department, FTC Skirmish Over
Antitrust Turf: Concerns Grow that Tussle Could Disrupt Coming Probes into Big Tech Companies,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-ftcskirmish-over-antitrust-turf-11564997402; see also Brent Kendall, Senators Question Two
Agencies’ Investigation of Big Tech Firms, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:01 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senator-questions-two-agencies-investigations-of-big-techfirms-11568750084 (“On Big Tech, lawmakers cited evidence that the two agencies aren’t
getting along and questioned whether turf wars are interfering with the government’s ability
to tackle pressing issues . . . .”).
14. McKinnon & Grimal, supra note 13; see also Asa Fitch, Justice Department Warns
Against Broad Penalty for Qualcomm in FTC Case, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2019, 2:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-warns-against-broad-penalty-forqualcomm-in-ftc-case-11556865004; Timothy Syrett, The FTC’s Qualcomm Case Reveals
Concerning Divide with DOJ on Patent Hold-Up, IP WATCHDOG (June 28, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/28/ftcs-qualcomm-case-reveals-concerningdivide-doj-patent-hold/id=110764/ (“The public feuding between the two federal antitrust
enforcement agencies about how to resolve a case litigated by one [of] them was a remarkable
spectacle. It also brought into focus a broader divide between the FTC and DOJ on the role
of antitrust law in addressing patents that are essential to industry standards (SEPs) and
subject to commitments to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms.”).
For those who are unfamiliar with the facts, in 2017 a divided FTC issued a complaint
attacking Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices. In 2019, the district court found that
Qualcomm had engaged in illegal monopolization and enjoined the company from
continuing the challenged conduct. Toward the close of the district court proceedings, DOJ
filed an “expression of interest” in the case and cautioned the trial judge to avoid the
imposition of severe remedies. Following the district court’s decision, DOJ successfully
petitioned the Ninth Circuit to stay the implementation of a number of the district court’s
remedies.
In its filings, DOJ urged the court of appeals to vacate the lower court’s decision, assailed the
FTC’s theory of the case and the district judge’s application of the law, and enlisted the
Departments of Defense and Energy to bolster its arguments. Shara Tibken, DOJ: Antitrust
Ruling Against Qualcomm Could ‘Put Our Nation’s Security at Risk, CNET (July 16, 2019, 5:01
PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/doj-says-antitrust-ruling-against-qualcomm-couldput-our-nations-security-at-risk/. For various filings relating to the FTC’s case against
Qualcomm, see Qualcomm Inc., Fed. Trade Commission (July 19, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0199/qualcomm-inc.
15. Competition Over the Antitrust Laws: DOJ and FTC Part Ways in the Supreme Court,
MAYER BROWN (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectivesevents/publications/2008/10/competition-over-the-antitrust-laws-doj-and-ftc-pa.
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granting of cert in the FTC’s case against Schering-Plough, and the
DOJ’s refusal to represent the FTC before the Supreme Court in
Indiana Federation of Dentists—prompting the FTC to pursue the
case itself.16
B. Privacy Law
Privacy law presents another useful case study of polycentrism
at the federal level, with some (but by no means all) of the ground
rules set by Congressional action. The most important federal
privacy institution is the FTC.17 Congress authorized the FTC to
pursue a privacy mandate in certain specified areas, but the FTC
has built a more extensive “common law” of privacy protection
using cases brought pursuant to its statutory mandate to pursue
“unfair or deceptive acts and practices.”18 The FTC has also used its
rulemaking authority to build important elements of the national
privacy architecture, including the Do-Not-Call rule.19
But primacy does not mean monopoly. The FTC Act largely
exempts banks, common carriers, and not-for-profit institutions
from the FTC’s oversight.20 Various sectoral regulators occupy
much of this policy terrain. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) exercises privacy oversight for
telecommunications providers—with the boundary between what
is (and is not) a telecommunications service moving in response to
technological change, court decisions, and the FCC’s own actions.21
Similarly, the Department of Education enforces the Family

16. James C. Miller III, Causes and Implications of the Regulatory Revolution at the FTC, in
THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 1, 7 (James Cooper ed., 2013).
17. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
192 (“The Federal Trade Commission has emerged as the nation’s top regulator of online
privacy.”); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2267 (2015) (“In the current U.S. privacy regulatory
system, the FTC has grown into the role of being the leading regulator of privacy . . . .”);
David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The Federal Trade Commission’s Second Hundred Years,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101, 2102–11 (2015).
18. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should
Do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1117, 1119–49 (2019).
19. Id. at 1131–32.
20. These jurisdictional limitations are described in ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
658–59 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012).
21. See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1674–75, 1697–98 (2016).
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Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which imposes
record-disclosure duties and limits on educational institutions and
state educational bodies that receive federal funds. The Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) plays the lead role in
enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”), which established data privacy obligations and
security requirements to safeguard medical information. Then
there is the DOJ, which is responsible for enforcing a collection of
criminal statutes which can be used to attack privacy-related
cybercrimes.
So far, we have focused on consumer-facing privacy—but of
course, multiple federal departments, agencies, and bureaus collect
and maintain information that implicates privacy concerns. The
good news is that many of these public entities have their own
privacy offices.22 The bad news is that each of them is largely free
to set their own privacy policies and make their own trade-offs.
As with competition law, there have been periodic disputes
among the regulatory agencies that occupy this policy space.
Consider the issue of how much privacy protection medical records
should have—and whether and when those privacy-related
interests should give way in the context of law enforcement
investigations. In an oral history interview conducted in 2007,
former HHS Secretary Donna Shalala explained that when the
HIPAA regulations were being drafted, HHS personnel prioritized
medical privacy while DOJ personnel prioritized law enforcement
interests:
On the privacy regulations, Janet Reno stopped me from—she
wanted any sheriff to be able to rifle through anyone’s health
records without a court order. I thought that was a terrible idea. I
lost it. We had a change in the chief of staff. Her deputy left who
was hot to trot on this issue. I went back in and argued the issue
and won it. Sticking around for eight years made a difference.23

22. See, e.g., Privacy, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/
topic/privacy (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). In addition, HHS, the
Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development all
have privacy offices as well.
23. Donna
Shalala
Oral
History,
MILLER
CTR.
(May
15,
2007),
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/donna-shalala-oralhistory-secretary-health-and-human.
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But in Washington, in the words of former Secretary of State George
Schultz, “it’s never over.”24 Secretary Shalala’s victory may turn
out to be substantially undone if a recent notice of proposed
rulemaking issued by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) is any indication.25
The FTC and FCC have also tussled over the best approach to
consumer privacy for internet service providers,26 and the FTC and
the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) have waged a behindthe-scenes campaign over which agency has the better framework
for advocating privacy when the United States is dealing with
foreign nations.27
As these examples illustrate, when it comes to privacy, different
agencies within the federal administrative state can have very
different interests, priorities, and goals. There is a Federal Privacy
Council, which is intended to support inter-agency coordination of
privacy protection.28 But the existence of the Privacy Council does
not mean that coordination across agencies will result. Some
disputes, like the one over law enforcement access to medical
records, involve claims where it is difficult or impossible to split the
baby. Finally, even when an agency has a long and distinguished
history of protecting privacy, the “felt necessities of the time” may
cause that agency to reverse course and then bury the evidence—

24. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 300 (1989).
25. Alison Knopf, SAMHSA Ushers in Law Enforcement “Fishing Expeditions” for MAT
Patients, FILTER MAG. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://filtermag.org/samhsa-law-enforcement-mat/
(discussing SAMHSA proposal that would allow investigation of one suspect to permit the
seizure of records of any other connected individuals or entities).
26. Amir Nasr, Roles of FTC, FCC Are Front and Center in Privacy Debate, MORNING
CONSULT (Sep. 27, 2016, 7:11 PM), https://morningconsult.com/2016/09/27/roles-ftc-fccfront-center-privacy-debate/.
27. Compare FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework for Consumers, Businesses,
and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2010/12/privacyreport.shtm; Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting
Consumer Privacy Online While Supporting Innovation, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec.
16, 2010), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2010/commerce-department-unveilspolicy-framework-protecting-consumer-privacy-online-w.
28. Purpose and Vision, FED. PRIVACY COUNCIL, https://www.fpc.gov/federalprivacy-council/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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as was the case with the Census Bureau’s release of information on
Japanese-Americans during World War II.29
C. Salmon
In the 2011 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama
spoke of the importance of reorganizing government to make it
work better:
We live and do business in the Information Age, but the last major
reorganization of the government happened in the age of blackand-white TV. There are twelve different agencies that deal with
exports. There are at least five different agencies that deal with
housing policy. Then there’s my favorite example: The Interior
Department is in charge of salmon while they’re in fresh water,
but the Commerce Department handles them when they’re in
saltwater. I hear it gets even more complicated once they’re
smoked.30

The joke about smoked salmon was the biggest laugh line of the
2011 State of the Union Address.31 The accompanying infographic,
reproduced below as Figure 1, also indicates that the problem of
regulatory authority over salmon is not to be taken seriously, and
is easily remedied once it is recognized as a problem.

29. Teresa Watanabe, In 1943, Census Released Japanese Americans’ Data, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2007 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-31-nacensus31-story.html; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed.”).
30. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011).
31. Admittedly, there typically isn’t much competition for the title of “biggest laugh
line in the State of the Union Address.”
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Figure 1: Allocation of Regulatory Responsibility for Salmon32
But, salmon (whether in fresh water, saltwater, or smoked)
actually exemplify the ways in which regulatory authority within
the federal administrative state is polycentric, as well as the role of
historical accident in creating that outcome. For starters, President
Obama is correct that regulatory authority over saltwater salmon is
in Commerce—but the only reason the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is in Commerce is because
of President Nixon’s personal pique at the then-Secretary of the
Department of the Interior (which was the leading candidate for
housing NOAA when it was created).33 Similarly, although
regulatory authority for fresh-water salmon primarily resides in the
32. 2011 Enhanced State of the Union Address Graphics, SLIDESHARE (Jan. 26, 2011) (slide
54), https://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/2011-enhanced-state-of-the-union-addressgraphics.
33. See Steven Eli Schanes, The Battle for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA)
1969-71,
SCHANES
(May
21,
2008,
8:11
PM),
http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/21/the-battle-for-the-national-oceanic-andatmospheric-administration-noaa/; see also Steven Eli Schanes, Putting NOAA Together- 1970,
SCHANES (May 24, 2008, 7:56 PM), http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/24/puttingnoaa-together-1970/; Eileen L. Shea, A History of NOAA, NOAA HISTORY
http://www.history.noaa.gov/legacy/noaahistory_1.html (last updated June 8, 2006, 9:24
AM).
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Department of the Interior (“Interior”), there are actually four
autonomous units within Interior that have some degree of
responsibility: the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of
Reclamation. Plus, there’s the Department of Defense (Army Corps
of Engineers), the Department of Energy (Bonneville Power
Administration), Commerce (the National Marine Fisheries
Service), and two autonomous units within the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA): the U.S. Forest Service and the Agricultural
Marketing Service. Fish that are caught and destined to be smoked
fall within the jurisdiction of the NOAA and the Department of
Health & Human Services (Food and Drug Administration).
Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency is involved, both
while the fish are alive in the wild (in connection with the
Endangered Species Act) and after they are caught (in connection
with the packaging materials used on smoked and raw fish).
Even if we focus on a more limited setting (say salmon that are,
or might one day, be swimming in the Columbia River Basin), the
number of federal entities that are involved is still quite impressive.
A 2002 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report counted
fully eleven federal agencies: The Department of Commerce’s
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
is responsible for preparing a recovery plan and consulting with
other federal agencies to determine whether the agencies’
planned actions will jeopardize listed salmon and steelhead
populations. In addition to NMFS, the federal agencies involved
in the recovery effort include the following:
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation, which operate the Columbia River Basin dams that
salmon and steelhead must pass, and the Bonneville Power
Administration, which markets the electric power created by
water flowing through the dams’ turbines.
• The U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service manage natural resources, which
include habitat for salmon and steelhead, for multiple purposes,
such as timber, grazing, fish, wildlife, and recreation.
• The Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Geological Survey,
Natural Resources Conservation Service, and Bureau of Indian
Affairs, which carry out various actions, such as setting water
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quality standards, performing research, working with
landowners, and protecting tribal fishing rights, all of which,
directly affect salmon and steelhead populations.34

Unsurprisingly, the welter of federal entities with an interest in
salmon has caused disputes.35 These disputes have broken down
along entirely predictable lines: the parts of the federal government
that care about outdoor recreation and threatened/endangered
species sided with the salmon, while the parts of the federal
government that care about dams, electrical power, and water for
agriculture were unconcerned about the plight of the salmon.
Consider the framing of the lawsuit that Oregon and a number of
private individuals and organizations brought against the federal
government:
Oregon wanted the federal agencies th[at] manage the flow of the
Columbia and Snake Rivers. . . to spill more water over dams in
order to improve young salmon’s [sic] odds of survival. Oregon
was supported by . . . some federal agencies sympathetic to more
salmon protection (the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Park Service). Unified against the suit were other, more
prominent agencies of the U.S. government (the Army Corps of
Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, and Bonneville Power
Administration or BPA). . . .36

That particular lawsuit dragged on for more than twenty years,
with multiple trips to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.37 The case

34. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 02-612, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN SALMON
AND STEELHEAD: FEDERAL AGENCIES’ RECOVERY RESPONSIBILITIES, EXPENDITURES AND
ACTIONS 2 (2002), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02612.pdf.
35. In fairness, there are many additional disputes involving various combinations of
individuals, states, native tribes, Canada, and Japan.
36. Ctr. for the Study of the Pac. Nw., Univ. of Wash., Lesson Two: To Whom Does the
Pacific Northwest Belong?, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, https://www.washington.edu/
uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom%20Materials/Pacific%20Northwest%20Histo
ry/Lessons/Lesson%202/2.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
37. BILL CRAMPTON & BARRY ESPENSON, COLUMBIA BASIN BULLETIN, AN ACCOUNT OF
LITIGATION OVER FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS FOR
SALMON AND STEELHEAD, 1991–2009 6 (1st ed. 2019); see also The Oregonian, Timeline, Major
Players in the Northwest Salmon Lawsuit in the Columbia River Basin,
https://www.oregonlive.com/environment/2011/05/timeline_major_players_in_the.html
(last updated Jan. 10, 2019).
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went on so long that the district court judge who first handled it
(Malcolm Marsh) became known as the “salmon judge.”38
Finally, although we focused in this section on salmon,
environmental matters present multiple instances of different parts
of the federal government being on opposite sides of the issue.39
D. Jurisdictional Chaos: Its Everywhere You Look
As these three case studies suggest, one can find overlapping
regulatory authority and inter-agency conflict everywhere one
looks in the federal government.40 For those who think we have
cherry-picked a few unrepresentative examples, we highlight the
findings of several official government reports drawn from the last
four decades. First up is a 2011 report from the GAO. Table 1 in that
report made it clear that there were multiple examples of
duplication, overlap and fragmentation, including fifteen different
agencies overseeing food-safety laws; more than twenty separate

38. Kelly A. Zusman, Judicial Profile Hon. Malcom F. Marsh US District Judge, District of
Oregon, FED. BAR ASS’N (July 2004), http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/Past-JudicialProfiles/Ninth-Circuit_1/Marsh-Hon-Malcolm.aspx; US DISTRICT COURT OF OREGON
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, MALCOLM MARSH: AN ORAL HISTORY, at ix (Donna Sinclair, ed.) (2007)
https://usdchs.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/malcolm-marsh-usdchs-oral-history.pdf.
39. See FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: A POLICY AND MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE 118 (2008) (“Senator Frank Moss ascribed the conflict between the National Park
Service and the Army Corps of Engineers over the Florida Everglades to ‘uncoordinated
activities.’ Park service officials complained that the engineers drained the Everglades
National Park almost dry in their efforts to halt wetlands flooding and reclaim glad country
for agriculture. The Army Corps of Engineers argued that wetlands were ‘for the birds’ and
flood control for the people.”). In U.S. v. Mast, Mast found himself criminally prosecuted for
draining wetlands, even though the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (part of the Department of
the Interior) and the U.S Natural Resources Conservation Service (part of the Department of
Agriculture) disagreed on whether his actions were permissible or not. 938 F.3d 973, 974 (8th
Cir. 2019). See also Lyndsey Layton, Pentagon Fights EPA on Pollution Cleanup, WASH. POST
(June 30, 2008) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/
AR2008062901977.html (“Although the law gives final say to EPA Administrator Stephen L.
Johnson in cleanup disputes with other federal agencies, the Pentagon refuses to recognize
that provision. Military officials wrote to the Justice Department last month to challenge
EPA’s authority to issue the orders and asked the Office of Management and Budget to
intervene.”); Elana Schor, Canada-U.S. Oil Pipeline Poses Few Environmental Risks—State Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/08/26/26greenwirecanada-us-oil-pipeline-poses-few-environmental-63932.html (noting disagreement between
Department of State and EPA over approval of Keystone pipeline, and the completeness of
the Environmental Impact Statement that was completed).
40. See Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 STAN. L. REV. 641 (2020)
(identifying multiple instances of conflict between executive agencies and administrative
agencies that played out in legal proceedings).
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programs (spread across seven federal agencies) to help the
homeless; eighty programs for economic development (spread
across four federal agencies); eighty-two programs to improve
teacher quality (spread across ten federal agencies); eighty
programs to help disadvantaged people with transportation
(spread across 8 federal agencies); forty-four programs for job
training and employment (spread across three agencies); and fiftysix programs spread across twenty agencies intended to improve
financial literacy.41
That report spawned a series of annual reports, the most recent
of which was issued in May 2019.42 All nine of these reports
documented multiple examples of duplication, overlap, and failed
coordination.
Next, there is the 2003 Volcker commission report on
government organization:
Prior to the post 9/11 reorganizations, over 40 federal agencies
were involved in activities to combat terrorism. The Department
of Housing and Urban Development operates 23 self-sufficiency
and economic opportunity programs that target tenants of public
housing and other low-income clients. Responsibility for federal
drug control strategies and their implementation is fragmented
among more than fifty federal agencies. There are over 90 early
childhood programs scattered among 11 federal agencies and 20
offices. Nine federal agencies administer 69 programs supporting
education and care for children under age five. There are 342
federal economic development related programs administered by
13 of the 14 cabinet departments. Seven agencies administer 40
different programs that have job training as their main purpose.
At least 86 teacher-training programs in nine federal agencies
fund similar types of services. Four agencies are responsible for
federal land management. . . There are 50 homeless assistance
programs administered by eight agencies . . . . 29 agencies
collectively share responsibility for federal clean air, clean and
safe water, and better waste management programs . . . . these

41. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE
REVENUE (2011).
42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-285SP, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT:
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE FRAGMENTATION, OVERLAP, AND DUPLICATION AND
ACHIEVE BILLIONS IN FINANCIAL BENEFITS (2019).
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divided responsibilities have produced 541 separate areas of
program activity.43

Twenty-six years earlier, when President Carter announced a
comprehensive study of reorganization in 1977, he provided
similar examples of duplication and inefficiency.44
We close with an example that should have particular
resonance for the citizens of Utah. Utah contains physically
contiguous National Parks, National Monuments, and National
Forests—all within easy driving distance of Provo. But the National
Parks and National Monuments are under the authority and
jurisdiction of Interior, while the National Forests are under the
authority and jurisdiction of USDA—with profound differences in
how the land in question is managed and the culture of the
responsible agencies. Since the lands in question are physically
adjoining, decisions made by the National Park Service will have
spillover effects on the land regulated by the U.S. Forest Service,
and vice-versa.
Of course, this dynamic isn’t limited to Utah: the fifteen million
acres of federal land surrounding and including Yellowstone
National Park “are managed by four federal agencies, the National
Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the Bureau of Land Management, each with differing
missions and organizational structures.”45 And there are more than
a dozen national forests that adjoin national parks.46 The history of
the National Forest Service is replete with examples of its attempts

43. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 36–37 (2003) [hereinafter “Volcker
Commission”], https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/01governance.
pdf.
44. The Am. Presidency Project, Jimmy Carter: Executive Branch Reorganization Studies
Remarks to Reporters Announcing the Studies, UC SANTA BARBARA, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/244146 (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
45. About,
GREATER
YELLOWSTONE
COORDINATING
COMMITTEE,
https://www.fedgycc.org/about.
46. Hannah Featherman, Sixteen National Forests Near National Parks, NATIONAL
FOREST FOUNDATION (Jun. 17, 2013), https://www.nationalforests.org/blog/sixteennational-forests-near-national-parks. The specific states are Arizona, California, Colorado,
Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
THE
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to manage this and other situations that call for coordination with
other branches of the federal government.47
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM
A. Cooperation, Rivalry, and Conflict Within the Federal Government
As Section II and our prior work make clear, the division of
regulatory “ownership” can result in cooperation, but it can also
result in rivalry and conflict.48 Agencies do not always agree on
whether there is a problem that needs fixing.49 Even when agencies
agree on the nature and seriousness of the problem, they can have
profound disagreements on the optimal solution, the best way to
achieve that outcome, and which of the rival agencies is best
situated to implement that solution. These disputes are often driven
by differences among agencies in tradition, culture, and ways of
looking at the world.
The two quotes with which we begin this Article exemplify the
ways in which we observe such patterns of conflict across different
branches of the military. A naïve observer might hope that such
problems are easily solvable within a single Department (like the
Department of Defense, or “DoD”), but difficult to solve across
Departments and independent agencies. Unfortunately, the
problem is sticky (if not intractable) even in the presence of strong
leadership exercised within a single Department. Once again, as the
two quotes that begin this Article exemplify, there are fundamental
persistent rivalries within individual branches of the military.50
Even the children of military personnel are rapidly socialized into
the tribal nature of the individual services.51 Further evidence on

47. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BAKER, ROBERT S. MAXWELL, VICTOR H. TREAT & HENRY C.
DETHLOFF, TIMELESS HERITAGE: A HISTORY OF THE FOREST SERVICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1988),
http://npshistory.com/publications/usfs/region/3/history/. Chapter 14 is devoted to
“Relations with Other Federal and State Agencies.”
48. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 10, at 1497.
49. The brawl between the FTC and the DOJ over Qualcomm exemplifies this
possibility. See supra note 14.
50. See supra note 14
51. MARY ELLEN WERTSCH, MILITARY BRATS: LEGACIES OF CHILDHOOD INSIDE THE
FORTRESS 311–12 (2006) (“When I was a small child, I understood that we were something
called an ‘Army family,’ although I had only a vague idea of what that meant. But I knew
one thing for certain: We were most definitely not Navy. . . . One Army colonel’s daughter
told me her father refused to attend her wedding because she was marrying a Navy brat.”).

1463

002.HYMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/25/20 11:24 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

this point is provided by the continuing debates over whether
military commands should be regional or functional, and where to
place the United States Space Force inside DoD.52
What are the implications of our findings for federalism? To the
extent there are differences of opinion within the polycentric
federal administrative state on an issue that raises issues of
federalism, the case for deference to the approach preferred by the
federal government (let alone preemption) is much weaker. After
all, if the federal government can’t speak with one voice or one
mind on the issue, why should the states lose to an internally
divided federal government in federalism cases?53 A hard-nosed
approach to this problem will create a substantial incentive for the
federal government to do a better job of getting its act together (in
every sense of those words) and take the necessary steps to fix the
organizational structure of the federal administrative state.
B. Engineering, Not Physics in Managing Federalism
During three years of private practice in the 1980s, one of us
(Kovacic) worked extensively with engineers in companies that had
participated in the U.S. space program in the 1960s. In a number of
conversations, the engineers recounted their frustration in listening
to physicists talk about space travel without addressing the
practical difficulties associated with sending humans 240,000 miles
to the moon—and then returning them alive. As Kovacic recalls,
one engineer observed that “the physics of going to the moon was
relatively straightforward—but the engineering was really dif-

52. Sandra Erwin, Defense Officials: New Military Branch Designed for the ‘Unique
Culture’ of Space, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 2, 2019), https://spacenews.com/defense-officials-newmilitary-branch-designed-for-the-unique-culture-of-space/.
53. See also Shah, supra note 40, at note 279 (“We love to hear from the federal
government. . . but it’s a bit awkward to hear from them on both sides.”); Neal Devins &
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J.
CON. L. 558, 573–74 (2003) (“Inconsistency will not only annoy judges, it will eliminate the
otherwise natural tendency to defer to the government’s presumably well-thought-out
position. Both in her direct admonitions, and indirectly through the evident importance that
she attaches to the matter and her somewhat testy tone, Judge Wald makes clear that simply
as a matter of litigating strategy it is a bad idea for the government to contradict itself.”); cf.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (“[W]hatever argument might be
mustered for deferring to the Executive on grounds of political accountability, surely it
becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from both sides of its mouth, articulating no
single position on which it might be held accountable.”).
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ficult.” Brilliant physics without equally brilliant engineering
would guarantee mission failure.
Discussions about public policy often reflect an analogous form
of tunnel vision. Politicians and policymakers (particularly those
who wish to be thought of as visionary leaders) routinely set out a
grand vision without thinking hard about the steps needed to
actually implement that vision in practice. Big policy ideas (the
physics of public administration) are destined to disappoint, unless
they are accompanied by skillful implementation (the engineering
of public administration).
In the federal-state relationship, the tension between policy
diversification and policy coherence poses daunting implementation challenges. But treating the matter as one of engineering
(rather than of physics) suggests various strategies for moderating
these challenges. At the outset, we set aside the most dramatic
solution of vesting sole responsibility in federal agencies, and
automatic preemption of state efforts and participation. On the
whole, we believe the benefits of decentralized authority—notably,
useful policy experimentation and prototyping, the supplementation of federal resources with state funding, and a critical
safeguard against simultaneous fifty-state catastrophic failure—
warrants continuation of a significant state role in multiple policy
domains.54 The politics of these issues are also quite daunting.
Stated differently, fair-weather federalism is far more common than
all-weather federalism.55

54. We address these arguments in Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6.
55. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chuck Schumer and Elizabeth Warren Are All for

State Autonomy—When the GOP’s in Charge, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/04/23/chuck-schumer-elizabeth-warren-marijuanafederalism-column/540253002/ (“Schumer and Warren’s interest in federalism would be
welcome if it were general and sincere, but it is limited and insincere.”); Michael Jonas,
Progressive Politics From the Ground Up, COMMONWEALTH (Jul. 11, 2017),
https://commonwealthmagazine.org/politics/progressive-politics-from-the-ground-up/
(“[B]oth sides are fair-weather federalists. Both sides will, depending on the politics of the
moment, prefer state or national power, depending on where they’re in control.”) (quoting
Dean Heather Gerken); Jacob Sullum, Fair-Weather Federalists, REASON (July 2012),
https://reason.com/2012/06/14/fair-weather-federalists/ (noting selective invocations of
federalism arguments); Garrett Epps, The Opportunists Friend (and Foe): State’s Rights, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/20/opinion/the-opportunist-sfriend-and-foe-states-rights.html (“[W]hen it comes to states’ rights, we are all hypocrites. . .
One scans American history in vain to find a major figure whose position on states’ rights
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At the same time, we think there is considerable room to
achieve greater policy coherence and more effective use of public
resources through “softer” forms of cooperation. We acknowledge
that our proposals are neither earth-shattering nor flamboyant—a
weakness which we believe is more than offset by the reality that
our modest strategies actually work well in practice, unlike the
more sweeping solutions that have been floated.56
Our chief suggestion is to expand the use of opt-in networks to
join up federal and state regulators. For example, a “Domestic
Competition Network” would engage federal and state agencies
with a competition policy mandate in regular consultations about
matters of common interest.57 For antitrust law and other areas of
regulatory policy, the program of a network of regulators would
have several dimensions, including the creation of working groups
to address various commercial phenomena, identifying allocations
of agency resources that would maximize the contributions of all
network participants, engage in common research projects,
establish interagency guidelines and protocols that clarify substantive standards and procedures, and convene events (e.g., hearings
and conferences) on topics of common concern.
To be successful, the networks would need to encourage
engagement at three levels of agency personnel: top leadership,
senior division managers, and case-handlers. For the latter group,
we can imagine a regular program of secondments by which
agencies exchange personnel to work inside their counterpart

was not directly connected to his or her position on the underlying political question. When
it suits our leaders, they are in favor of broad federal power; when it does not, they claim
‘states’ rights.’”)
For a recent example, see Kendall, supra note 13 (noting opposition by Democrats in Congress
to a federal antitrust investigation of four automobile companies that “struck a deal with
California on vehicle-emissions standards”).
56. Three rationales justify starting small. First, such measures can make useful
contributions by themselves. Second, in the aggregate, they can create an environment in
which bolder approaches might flourish, while simultaneously operating as a test bed for
developing prototypes for more elaborate programs in the future. And third, small steps
stand a greater chance of success because their scale is more manageable, and they are less
likely to trigger push-back than “swinging for the fences.”
57. See William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION
LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 316 (Richard A.
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).
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institutions.58 This mechanism provides a means for sharing
knowledge and building the personal relationships and trust that
facilitate interagency cooperation. The sharing of knowledge is a
vital objective of the networking initiatives we propose, since it
accelerates learning and convergence on better practices far quicker
than would be the case if each institution functioned in isolation.
Networking can convert a collection of flatter learning curves into
a single steeper learning curve that enables all participating
institutions to make progress more quickly.
Enhanced networking also fits well into a decentralized policy
environment and stimulates opting-in to better practices.
Individual institutions would continue to conduct policy experiments, informed by the larger body of experience accumulated by
all related institutions. Networking would encourage agencies to
report to each other on the design and implementation of
individual policy experiments and to devise techniques for
measuring outcomes. The disclosure of experiment design and
operations, and the evaluation of results would inform judgments
by each policymaker about whether to emulate the policy technique
in question.
Of course, creating and nurturing these networks involves
answering a host of practical questions, virtually all of which lie
beyond the scope of this paper. For those who are skeptical of the
utility of opt-in networks to improve policymaking, we note that
we are not writing on a blank slate. As part of the modernization of
their competition regime in 2004, the European Union established
a European Competition Network that joins up the EU Member
State competition authorities in regular discussions, along with the

58. To be sure, secondments are not a magical solution to rivalry and cultural conflict.
See John Diamond, CIA & FBI in the Hot Seat; Officials Seek ‘Smoking Gun’ as Agencies Trade
Volleys in Sept. 11 Blame Game, USA TODAY, June 4, 2002, at A10 (noting that after the CIA
and FBI announced that analysts from each agency would be detailed to the other in order
to break down these barriers, personnel at both agencies called it a “hostage exchange
program”). Attitudes toward the secondment were understandably negative: “One of the
FBI agents tapped to participate in the program turned down the assignment and went to
the CIA only after he was ordered to report there. ‘A detail assignment [to the CIA] was like
death,’ he recalled. ‘I thought, “I don’t know these people. I don’t like these people. I don’t
trust these people.”‘“ AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF
9/11 , at 79 (2007).
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Competition Directorate of the European Commission.59 Similarly,
when the United Kingdom reformed its competition system in
2014, it formed a competition network that engages the Competition
and Markets Authority (the national competition agency) in regular
discussions with sectoral regulators (such as OFCOM, the telecommunications regulator) with a competition mandate.60 A third
example is the Common Ground Conferences that the FTC and
various state attorneys general have convened to address specific
policy issues.61 All of these networks have proven valuable in
improving the performance of the overall regulatory system while
preserving opportunities for individual experimentation.
Of course, forming new institutional frameworks does not
guarantee that the potential benefits (enhanced policy coordination) will be realized in practice, let alone maximized. For
networks to work well, top agency leadership must visibly commit
time and effort to building and maintaining relationships with their
counterparts across regulatory entities. Effectiveness also depends
on the willingness of senior leadership to operate collegially with
their agency peers and to see value in the development of enhanced
interagency collaboration. The success achieved by the three
networks highlighted previously shows that networking initiatives
can be done and done well.
Over time, soft convergence mechanisms embodied in networking can provide a basis for developing more formal binding policy
instruments. The confidence and experience gained by networked
cooperation can inform judgments about statutory reform regarding
substantive standards and procedures, with convergence on better,
if not necessarily best, practices. Stated differently, our modest
proposal can be an important step toward bolder forms of policy
convergence.

59. European Competition Network, EUROPEAN COMMISSION—COMPETITION, https://
ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
60. UK Competition Network, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/
uk-competition-network (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
61. See, e.g., Working Together to Protect Midwest Consumers: A Common Ground
Conference, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sep. 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/events-calendar/working-together-protect-midwest-consumers-common-groundconference.

1468

002.HYMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1447

9/25/20 11:24 AM

State Enforcement in a Polycentric World

C. Reasons for Optimism
To say that our proposals are “modest” is not to say that they
are easy to execute. But all is not lost. Even though the federal
administrative state is polycentric, usually different agencies can
get on the same page—or at least in the same ballpark. And federal
and state authorities seem to be able to figure out how to get along
much of the time, with some jousting at the margins to ensure each
side respects the other’s turf.
In practice, these temporary détentes paper over the dispute
long enough for us to resolve most of the issues that are the bread
and butter of federalism scholars. And, the proposals we outline in
Part III.B may help deal with an appreciable number of the
remainder. However, for those issues where there is persistent
divergence within the federal administrative state, we think it is
time to say “enough already” in handling that subset of federalism
cases.
As the Volcker Commission noted, “[t]hose who enter public
service often find themselves at sea in an archipelago of agencies
and departments that have grown without logical structure,
deterring intelligent policymaking. The organization and
operations of the federal government are a mixture of the outdated,
the outmoded and the outworn.”62 Given this dynamic, it is
remarkable that our polycentric federal administrative state
operates as well as it does.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are good reasons why we keep fighting about federalism.
Like all wicked problems, disputes over federalism surface
fundamental disagreements about priorities and goals.
Technological development changes the facts on the ground—and
often prompts reexamination of old compromises and upend the
(once stable, but now fragile) coalitions that supported those
solutions. That is why wicked problems resist permanent solutions.
But, our ongoing debates over federalism also offer an opportunity
and a focal point for improving the performance of the federal

62. Volcker Commission, supra note 43, at 1.
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administrative state, and coordination between the state and
federal governments. We can do better. We should start doing so.
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